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The Start-Up Fund – An Elegant Treaty 
Mechanism for Sustaining Defence Capabilities  
Quentin Huxham & Dinesh H.C. Rempling 
When  the  European  Council  meets  in 
December, it will face a range of decisions 
which will lay the foundations for Europe's 
defence posture and role in the wider world 
for decades to come, perhaps even beyond 
the remainder of this century.  The Lisbon 
Treaty has, for the first time, equipped the 
EU with the range of means to meet that 
role in practice.  The question that remains 
to be answered is whether Europe's leaders 
have  the  political  will  to  implement  those 
means in full. 
At  his  regular  press  briefing  on  6  May  2013, 
NATO  Secretary  General  Anders  Fogh 
Rasmussen,  dramatically  threw  down  the 
gauntlet  to  Europe's  leaders  ahead  of  this 
December's  European  Council.    Emphasising 
the  need  for  improved  cooperation  and 
coordination between NATO and the EU, he 
called on Europe's leaders to ensure that, as a 
result  of  the  first  discussion  about  European 
security  since  the  financial  crisis  at  the 
European Council in December, Europe would 
be both willing and able to act in the interests 
of transatlantic security. 
 
When  asked  directly  what  NATO  and  the 
EU  could  actually  do  to  bolster  Europe's 
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weakening  defence  industrial  base  and 
declining  R&D  expenditure,  the  Secretary 
General said that the answer was very simple:  
“to  invest  more  in  defence”.    Making  his 
challenge  to  Europe's  leaders  even  more 
explicit,  he  went  on  to  say  that  if  the  EU 
Summit  failed  to  deliver  this  “then  all  talk 
about  a  strengthened  European  defence  will 
just be hot air”. 
 
According to official NATO figures, since 
the end of the Cold War, whereas US defence 
expenditure before the sequester was broadly 
where it was in the immediate aftermath of the 
fall of the Berlin wall (5.4% of GDP in 2010 
compared to an average of 5.0% in 1990-94), 
defence expenditure in Europe has crumbled 
(from 2.5% in 1990-94 to less than 1.8% since 
2009).    But  it  is  not  only  the  volume  of 
defence  expenditure  in  Europe  that  is  the 
cause of concern; it is the combination of that 
with  the  context  in  which  it  is  taking  place.  
Prior  to  the  end  of  the  Cold  War,  when 
NATO Europe was devoting 2.5% of GDP to 
defence,  NATO  Europe  forces  per  se  had 
never  been  deployed  into  active  hostilities.  
Since 1990, however, these forces have been 
deployed  almost  continually,  first  in  the 
Balkans and Kosovo backing up the UN, then 
in Afghanistan and most recently in northern 
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Africa, which set a new precedent by not being 
US-led.    With  the  US  now  cutting  its 
expenditure  as  a  result  of  the  sequester,  and, 
following the “pivot to Asia”, now referred to 
as “rebalancing”, concentrating those reduced 
resources  in  the  Pacific  region,  a  far  greater 
burden of responsibility is now going to fall on 
NATO Europe in general and its EU Member 
States  in  particular,  just  as  the  resources  to 
meet  those  challenges  have  been  cut  to  the 
bone. 
 
However,  it  is  not  just  an  issue  of  the 
volume and context of that expenditure; it is 
also  an  issue  about  the  division  of  that 
expenditure  between  manpower  and 
equipment. 
 
Since the end of the Cold War, the US has 
cut its military personnel by around 35%, while 
leaving  its  equipment  budget  more  or  less 
intact,  if  not  reinforced,  so  making  the  US 
military  leaner,  fitter,  more  flexible  and  thus 
more  deployable.    While  the  UK  and  France 
have both moved in this direction as well since 
the  St.  Malo  agreement,  most  EU  Member 
States  have  not  followed  suit,  so  that  while 
personnel numbers are about 40% down since 
the  end  of  the  Cold  War,  the  proportion  of 
expenditure  on  personnel  remains  excessively 
high and equipment budgets in many Member 
States  have  been  excessively  squeezed.    Thus 
EU Members of NATO are less prepared to 
respond to crises just at the time that they face 
more,  and  more  challenging  and  complex, 
responsibilities “out of theatre”. 
 
Thus  NATO  Europe  needs  to  go  much 
further  in  reducing  expenditure  on  non-
deployable  personnel,  so  liberating  further 
funding  for  equipment  essential  for  “out  of 
theatre” operations. 
 
THE LISBON TREATY AND THE START-
UP FUND 
The asymmetry of defence expenditure across 
the Atlantic has dogged NATO throughout its 
history,  but  it  was  unable  to  address  the 
problems  as  NATO  acts  exclusively  by 
consensus.    However,  it  has  become 
increasingly  apparent  since  the  Maastricht 
Treaty that the mismatch between the defence 
equipment market and the rest of the Single 
Market was becoming an disturbing anomaly, 
not  least  as  an  ever  greater  number  of  the 
components  used  in  defence  equipment 
equally have civilian applications subject to the 
normal rules of the Single Market, established 
by qualified majority voting (QMV). 
 
The European Defence Agency (EDA) was 
specifically  established  to  address  this 
fundamental  problem  at  the  heart  of  the 
European defence industry and its market, but 
until  QMV  was  enshrined  into  the  Lisbon 
Treaty with the establishment of the Start-Up 
Fund,  the  EDA  was  always  going  to  be 
tackling the problem with one arm tied behind 
its back.  
 
Article  41(3)  of  the  Treaty  on  European 
Union explicitly states:  “Preparatory activities for 
the tasks referred to in Article 42(1) and Article 43 
which are not charged to the Union budget shall be 
financed by a start-up fund made up of Member States' 
contributions.  The Council shall adopt by a qualified 
majority, on a proposal from the High Representative of 
the  Union  for  Foreign  Affairs  and  Security  Policy, 
decisions …”.  
 
The  Treaty  thus  provides  for  the 
establishment of the Start-Up Fund, but leaves 
the  decisions  concerning  the  practicalities,  in 
particular  the  definition  of  what  constitutes 
“preparatory  activities”,  to  the  normal  political 
process.  The Lisbon Treaty makes a very clear 
distinction between the “preparatory activities” 
to which the Start-Up Fund, and thus QMV, 
applies and all other defence-related decisions, 
which  remain  subject  to  unanimity,  notably 
concerning  decisions  about  operations 
(“missions” in the language of the Treaty) and 
tasks,  as  set  out  in  Article  43  of  the  Lisbon 
Treaty on European Union (TEU).   3 
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As  the  Treaty  itself  does  not  define  what 
“preparatory  activities  for  the  tasks  referred  to  in 
Article 42(1) and Article 43” are, this will have to 
be decided by the Council, acting “by a qualified 
majority”.    This  is  the  challenge  confronting 
Europe's leaders at this December's Summit. 
 
IMPLEMENTING THE START-UP FUND 
Following  the  Franco-British  Summit  in  St. 
Malo  in  December  1998,  the  EU  moved 
remarkably  swiftly  to  put  the  main  principles 
enshrined  in  the  St.  Malo  Declaration  into 
practice at the EU level, but in the process, the 
Council  has  identified  a  number  of  EU 
shortfalls which are regarded as critical, notably 
relating to the capability of transporting forces 
to  theatre,  deploying  them  in  theatre  and 
protecting them while they are there.  Strategic 
transport  assets  and  the  availability  of 
helicopters  are  obvious  examples  of  these 
shortfalls. 
 
It has always been, even well before the end 
of  the  Cold  War,  very  much  in  the  Franco-
British interest for all EU states to bear a more 
equitable  burden  on  defence  expenditure  in 
general, and the equipment budget in particular, 
than  they  have  ever  managed  to  do  since 
NATO's  inception.    Following  the  Lisbon 
Treaty,  only  the  EU  provides  the  legal  and 
political  framework  for  overcoming  this 
problem,  as  Article  41(3)(a)  requires  the 
Council  to  decide,  by  qualified  majority:  “the 
procedures  for  setting  up  and  financing  the  start-up 
fund, in particular the amounts allocated to the fund”. 
 
Evidently, the IGC took the view that such 
intensely political decisions could only be taken 
by  ministers  in  the  course  of  the  normal 
political  process.    But  broadly  speaking,  they 
will  have  to  choose  between  three  basic 
options:  to spend more on defence overall in 
the light of the EU/NATO Europe's enhanced 
role in transatlantic security in recent years; to 
spend  less  but  maintain  existing  outputs 
through enhanced efficiency, not least through 
the  collaboration  that  the  Start-Up  Fund 
entails; or to enhance outputs while remaining 
budgetarily  neutral,  as  a  result  of  the 
efficiencies gained through the Start-Up Fund.  
Which way ministers will ultimately go remains 
to  be  seen,  but  the  whole  point  of  qualified 
majority voting is that the decision will go with 
the  option  that  gains  the  greatest  consensus, 
while no individual Member State will be able 
to wield a veto, as would be the case within 
NATO. 
 
But beyond making up for existing shortfalls 
as  recognized  by  the  Council  and  for 
establishing  a  fairer,  more  equitable  burden 
sharing on defence expenditure among the EU 
Member  States,  there  is  a  range  of  other 
decisions that ministers will also have to make 
in order to implement the bare bones of the 
Treaty's  provisions.    The  most  important  of 
these will be the scope of the activities of the 
Start-Up Fund. 
 
POTENTIAL  RANGE  OF  “PREPARATORY 
ACTIVITIES” 
The best starting point for defining what the 
Start-Up Fund should do is in the remit of the 
EDA provided in Article 42(3) TEU, which it 
says is the “defence capability development, research, 
acquisition  and  armaments”  agency  and  is 
responsible  for  measures  to  “strengthen  the 
industrial and technological base of the defence sector”.  
This, in a nutshell, encompasses what the IGC 
intended by “preparatory activities”, which clearly 
goes  well  beyond  just  the  development  and 
acquisition of equipment. 
 
In  the  spirit  of  Pooling  and  Sharing  and 
Smart Defence, there are a number of topics 
that could be addressed that fit under the label 
“preparatory  activities.”  If  these  “preparatory 
activities”  are  translated  into  “the  continuing 
process  of  ensuring  appropriate  readiness, 
resilience and quality of capabilities through a 
methodical capability development and capacity 
building regime” the EU Start-Up Fund could   4 
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open the door to sustaining the effectiveness of 
EU  defence  and  crisis  management.    The 
following  is  an  indicative  list  of  areas  that  if 
backed-up  by  the  Start-Up  Fund  could 
significantly  enhance  EU  capabilities,  increase 
efficiency, both technological and financial and 
boost the EU’s domestic security as much as its 
global role : 
 
•  Science, Technology and Innovation: As the 
EU's  multiannual  R&D  Framework 
Programmes  and  the  ESA's  Science  and 
Technology  Programme  have  demonstrated 
over the past few decades, R&D is an area which 
has been shown beyond doubt to benefit from a 
multinational  and  multiannual  approach  to 
funding.  Then  Europe  can  perform  on  equal 
terms  with  the  rest  of  the  world  and,  as  with 
CERN, even lead the world.  For all the reasons 
alluded to above, this has never really happened 
on a properly coordinated basis in Europe as far 
as defence is concerned and is one of the key 
reasons why the EU and NATO Europe have 
tended to lag behind the US over recent decades.  
This should therefore be the very first priority to 
address through the Start-Up Fund. 
•   
However,  there  are  certain  specificities  to 
defence-related R&D that do not apply either to 
the EU's civilian industrial programme or even 
the ESA's programme, as defence equipment is 
neither  purely  scientific,  nor  is  it  purely 
commercial  operating  in  a  “normal”  market, 
given  that  for  the  vast  majority  of  products, 
governments  are  the  sole  purchasers,  and  the 
military  have  certain  requirements  the  cost  of 
which  would  never  be  supported  by  a  purely 
civilian market. That said, the building-blocks of 
many  of  these  products,  especially  at  lower 
systems levels, often have dual-use applications. 
Establishing  a  “Hoover  and  Harvest”  mechanism 
backed by the Start-Up Fund would enable the 
EU to maximize the return on total investments 
in  civilian  and  defence  R&D  in  particular  by 
enabling entrepreneurs to present their business 
cases to a panel of expert financiers to expedite 
the  process  of  turning  business  ideas  into 
profitable products. If this were established as 
a public-private mechanism, it would provide a 
forum  in  which  technological  innovations 
would  gain  exposure  to  defence  and  civilian 
investors, the latter thus opening up the door 
for  both  institutional  and  private  venture 
capital.  
 
The “Hoover and Harvest” concept could 
be designed with three primary aims. The first 
would  be  to  act  as  the  bridge  over  the 
infamous void between research funding and 
funding associated with product development 
(also  known  as  the  “valley  of  death”).  The 
second  would  be  to  expose  innovations 
coming  from  both  the  civilian  and  defence 
domains with the ambition of identifying new 
opportunities in the path of exploitation that 
could be beneficial for the whole of Europe. 
The third would be to ensure that the path of 
exploitation  actually  leads  to  a  competitive 
product with export potential. 
 
•  Common  Asset  Acquisition  and 
Management: However complex, acquisition 
of common assets and providing appropriate 
through-life  management  for  certain 
applications  might  be  the  only  viable  way 
ahead  in  a  cost  sensitive  future.  A  recent 
example  of  this  is  the  acquisition  and 
deployment into ISAF of a forensic capability. 
EDA provided the seed funding on behalf of 
all its Member States for the actual acquisition 
and  a  coalition  of  the  willing  deployed  the 
equipment  into  theatre  along  with  personnel 
and  logistical  support,  such  that  it  has  since 
autumn  of  2011  provided  an  important 
exploitation capability. This is a good example 
of how having access to the funding necessary 
for initial acquisition significantly catalyses the 
process – one and a half years after receiving 
the ministerial green light to use EDA funds 
for  the  acquisition,  the  capability  was  in 
operation.      This  could  be  extended  by  the 
creation  of  a  network  of  certified  forensic 
laboratories bringing together both the civilian 
and  military  intelligence  communities,  thus   5 
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strengthening both domestic security and that of 
personnel deployed on operations.  There is an 
opportunity  for  the  Start-Up  Fund  to  play  a 
similar  role  on  a  wider  scale  building  on  this 
example,  including  “through-life  management” 
arrangements  applicable  to  existing  multi-
national pooling and sharing regimes. 
 
•  Knowledge  Base:  Knowledge,  Skills  and 
Competences  (KSC)  are  the  backbone  of 
capabilities.  Without  a  strong  knowledge  base 
there is a risk of increased dependencies on non-
European  sources  to  the  extent  that  it  might 
compromise  one  or  more  capabilities.  This 
applies  to  the  whole  chain,  from  tactical  KSC 
through  design  and  production  all  the  way  to 
management of requirements. It is apparent that 
there  are  areas  within  defence  and  crisis 
management  where  the  ageing  of  staff  along 
with the lack of influx of younger generations is 
threatening to compromise capabilities. This is 
particularly  evident  in  research,  design  and 
manufacturing.  It  is  also  apparent  that  tactical 
experience  from  theatre  can  be  lost  as 
operations come to an end, at the cost of loss of 
lives the next time around (as has already been 
witnessed  in,  for  example,  the  countering  of 
improvised  explosive  devices).    The  Start-Up 
Fund  can  support  deploying  mechanisms  for 
capturing KSC, establishing critical KSC centres 
and  strengthening  of  education  and  training 
schemes, for instance in the fields of energetics 
and  munitions  research,  where  defence 
companies  often  face  stiff  competition  for 
scientific  excellence  from  other  sectors  of 
private  industry.    By  supporting  the 
establishment  of  exchange  programmes  and 
post-graduate research centres, the Fund could 
provide a vital boost to the research base as well 
as  reinforce  more  vocational  skills  such  as 
precision  mechanics  and  test  and  evaluation 
engineers. 
 
•  Climate, Environment and Energy Security:  
Making  the  defence  and  crisis  management 
community  more  sustainable  in  terms  of  its 
energy  use  and  impact  on  the  environment, 
and thus more consistent than it presently is 
with  the  EU's  general  climate  and 
environmental  strategy,  offers  a  new 
opportunity  for  the  Start-Up  Fund.  EDA’s 
vehicle for this is Military Green, an umbrella 
effort that could translate into a programme. 
However, funding is an issue and there is little 
money  in  defence  budgets  earmarked  for 
energy and environment. There is a clear role 
for  the  Start-Up  Fund  in  promoting  and 
facilitating  development  and  use  of  more 
responsible systems and technologies. There is 
even  a  strong  case  for  having  a  dedicated 
section  of  the  Start-Up  Fund  to  support 
“Military  Green”  programmes  specifically, 
such as those currently eligible under the “Go 
Green”  project  for  retrofitting  military 
infrastructure  with  renewable  sources  of 
energy and for facilitating the achievement of 
the  EU  Military  Staff’s  Environmental 
Protection  Concept’s  priorities  (approved  by 
ministers in autumn of 2012), notably energy, 
water  and  waste  management  by  EU  forces 
deployed abroad. 
 
Mitigating  risks  to  international  security 
coming  from  changes  to  climate  and 
biodiversity requires the development of a new 
palette of capabilities. There is also the aspect 
of  governing  climate/geo  engineering,  an 
emerging sector with a good cause but in the 
wrong  hands  it  could  act  as  a  threat.  Since 
tackling climate change is in the interests of the 
EU as a whole, using the Start-Up Fund to this 
end,  where  appropriate  in  collaboration  with 
the  European  Commission  and  the  civilian 
sector,  could  bring  benefits  well  beyond  the 
strictly military sphere. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Beyond this range of “preparatory activities”, 
the  Start-Up  Fund  could  be  an  invaluable 
instrument to achieve other fundamental EU 
military  objectives,  including  reducing 
Europe's dependence on imported technology,   6 
 
providing a common European mechanism for 
test and evaluation of new technologies as they 
emerge from the joint research effort, providing 
much more extensive homecoming support for 
personnel  serving  abroad  than  currently  exists 
and  for  providing  improved  infrastructure  for 
evidence-based operations.  
 
In  conclusion,  the  Lisbon  Treaty  provides 
Europe's  leaders  with  the  means  to  tackle 
Europe's  long-standing  security  and  defence 
deficiencies,  but  only  Europe's  leaders 
themselves can demonstrate that they have the 
will to use these means to ensure that Europe's 
defence is not “just hot air”. 
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